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Abstract. In this paper I provide an excursus, as complete as I could, of the most important theoretical and experimental 
works concerning fairness. The aim is twofold. First of all, I want to underline the importance of the role played by 
experimental economics in testing and improving models on this topic. Secondly, I want to mention some evidence that, even 
for fair-minded people, economic factors such as competition and costs, still matter in their decisional process.    2
 
Introduction 
In this paper I provide an excursus,  as complete as I could, of the most important 
theoretical and experimental works concerning fairness. The aim to underline the importance 
of the role played by experimental economics in testing and improving models on this topic. 
Section 1 is devoted to economic models concerning fairness, while section 2 surveys the 
most relevant contributions from other disciplines. Section 3 deals with the experimental 
evidence and the most important games used to detect fairness. Section 4 (named ‘Not only 
fairness’) mentions some evidence that, even for fair-minded people, economic factors such 
as competition and costs, still matter in their decisional process. Section 5 presents the 
conclusions.   
 
   3
 
1. The economic models 
Fairness-driven motivations play a relevant role during people’s decisional process. 
Fairness considerations influence human behavior so that individuals act in a different way 
with respect to the theoretical predictions based on the classical image of the Homo 
Oeconomicus. Several experimental works prove that fairness matters and that not all the 
subjects are interested only in their material return.
1 A wide range of studies has been 
conducted on individuals’ tendency to appreciate and promote a fair behavior (see for 
instance, Abbink, Sadrieh and Zamir, 2004; Decker, Stieheler and Strobel, 2003; Carpenter 
and Matthews, 2005). Consequently, fairness has been introduced in the economic theories 
and new economic models have been developed to update the classical figure of Homo 
Oeconomicus. 
However, even if the idea that fair-minded people exist is almost unanimously accepted 
among economists, there is still disagreement about which kind of fairness is relevant. 
Different trends of economic models have been inspired by a couple of notions of fairness. 
Inequity-aversion theories are based on the relevance of the fairness of the outcome (Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000); intention-based reciprocity theories point 
to the importance of a fair reaction to someone’s intentions (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger, 2004); hybrid models (Falk and Fischbacher, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; 
Kohler, 2003) either merge both theories or add social-welfare concern to one of them.  
In the first class of models, a subject considers a situation as unfair if and only if the final 
distribution of the outcomes is not equitable, independently of the intentions of the others and 
their actions. This means that subjects’ utilities depend not only on their own payoff but also 
on the payoffs of the others and that  inequity-averse subjects spend resources to resist to 
unfairness and have more equitable outcomes.  
A relatively simple but at the same time suitable self-centred model is proposed by Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999). They assume that a player is altruistic towards the others if their 
material payoffs do not exceed an egalitarian benchmark, but she feels envy when it happens. 
Subject i’s utility function is: 
 
Ui(x1, …, xN) = xi – [αi/(N – 1)]max { } 0 , i
i j
j x x − ∑
≠
   
                                                 
1 Bosman and van Winden, 1999, for example, argue that there is no clear-cut distinction between selfish and fair-
minded individuals. The idea is that both features are present in a single subject and that, according to the situation, 
the behavior is consistent with the strongest one.   4
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i x x − ∑
≠
   
 
Where: 
αi is a parameter of envy 
βi is a parameter of altruism 
0 < βi<1 and αi  > βi  since the disutility that comes from a position of disadvantage is higher 




0 ≥ ∂ ∂ j i x U  iff   j i x x ≥  since an increase in other people’s income is positive if and only if 
they have a lower level of income with respect to subject i. 
 
This modified utility is useful to represent both positive and negative behavior towards 
the others. Moreover, Fehr and Schmidt assume that people are heterogeneous.  


























The difference is that in the model of Fehr and Schmidt a player compares her payoff to 
each of the other players. Consequently, subjects’ utility decreases as the distribution of 
payoffs diverges from the egalitarian distribution. In the model of Bolton and Ockenfels the 
                                                 
2 For a more complete explanation of the parameters see Fehr and Schmidt (1999), pp. 823-4. 
 
3 Bolton and Ockenfels call it motivation function to emphasize the fact that it represents the ‘objectives that motivate 
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comparison is with the average income. This means that subjects are not egalitarian and they 
consider their payoff as unfair only if it diverges from the average, independently of the 
distribution among the others.
4 ‘In a real life situation Fehr and Schmidt predict that the 
middle class would tax the upper class to subsidize the poor’ while according to Bolton and 
Ockenfels ‘the middle class would just be satisfied’.
5   
 
The theories based on models of intention-based reciprocity are characterised by the fact 
that only the intentions of the subjects matter to determine whether someone’s behavior is 
kind or less. These theories call into question the consequentialism of the standard utility 
theory, which assumes that the utility of an action depends only on its consequences. This 
approach implies the use of psychological game theory (Geanakoplos et al., 1989), where 
utilities depend not only on payoffs but also on players’ belief. The first step to introduce 
fairness into the analysis is to identify what Rabin (1993) calls a kindness function fi(ai, bj), 
which measures how kind player i is being to player j. ai represents player i’s strategy while 
bj represents the strategy player i believes player j will adopt. Rabin defines also player i’s 
belief about player j’s kindness function fj(aj, ci). ci  represents the strategy player i believes 
player j believes that player i will adopt. Then, all these components enter subject i’s utility 
function Ui(ai, bj, ci). The same happens for player j’s utility function Uj(aj, bi, cj). The 
solution (ai, aj) is the so-called fairness equilibrium and it represents the Nash equilibrium 
for psychological games (Psychological Nash equilibrium – GPS). The idea is that if player i 
believes that player j is treating her badly, that is, if fj(aj, ci) is negative, then she wishes to 
treat player j badly. A similar reasoning is made for the case where player i believes that 
player j is treating her kindly. However, Rabin underlines that in his model material interest 
matters: ‘the specified utility function is such that players will trade off their preference for 
fairness against their material well-being, and material pursuits may override concerns for 
fairness. […] the bigger the material payoff, the less the players’ behavior reflects their 
concern for fairness’.
6 An undesirable feature of this model (and of the models that use 
psychological game theory in general) is that there are multiple and counterintuitive 
equilibria and it is very complex to compute them.  
                                                 
4 Engelmann and Strobel (2000) compare experimentally the model of Fehr and Schmidt to the model of Bolton and 
Ockenfels. They analyse subjects’ preferences by presenting three different allocations of money between three persons, 
of which people have to choose one. According to the selected allocations, it is possible to understand which model has 
the higher predictive power. The experimental results are in favour of the model of Fehr and Schmidt. 
 
5 Engelmann and Strobel, 2000, p.2. 
6 Rabin, 1993, p.1287   6
 
Another limitation of this model is that it is suitable only for non-dynamic situations. 
This is why Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) provide an extension of Rabin’s model. 
They consider finite sequential games and they introduce the notion of Sequential 
Reciprocity Equilibrium. The model is very similar to the one proposed by Rabin. Players’ 
utility is the sum of a material payoff function and a reciprocity payoff. As in Rabin, the 
reciprocity payoff depends on players’ beliefs about other players’ strategies and beliefs. The 
real new point is that at each node that is reached, players’ beliefs about others’ intentions 
evolve. This means that every subgame has its equilibrium that depends only on players’ 
beliefs at that particular stage and not on initial beliefs. However, also in this case, the 
disadvantages of this model are the complexity and the multiple equilibria. 
Experimental evidence suggests that a motivation that may explain subjects’ behavior in 
a particular game, is not able to predict people’s actions in a different situation (for example, 
reciprocity may explain why in the Ultimatum Game the Receiver refuses a low offer, but 
cannot explain a Dictator’s transfer greater than 0 in a Dictator Game). The validity of each 
single motivation in an exclusive domain is the reason why hybrid models exist. These 
models merge different motivations to better predict subjects’ actions (Figure 1 presents the 
three hybrid models treated in this paper).  
 
Figure 1 














                                                 
7 Inspired by Kohler, 2003, p.3. 























Falk and Fischbacher (2000) argue, on the basis of the experimental evidence, that 
neither inequity aversion nor intentions can be ignored, and they provide a new model for 
sequential games where they try to merge the previous two approaches. At each node a 
player i’s utility is: 
 
() () ()( ) f n n f f U
i N n
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i i i , σ ϕ ρ π ∑
∈
→
+ =  
 
where: 
f = the end node of the game; 
n = the node where i has to move. 
  
This is the sum of her material payoff  i π (f)  and of what Falk and Fischbacher call 
reciprocity utility. This element is composed of the reciprocity parameter  i ρ , the kindness 
termϕ and the reciprocation termσ . The reciprocity parameter i ρ  represents the intensity 
of player i’s desire to reciprocate with respect to the desire to increase her material payoff. 
The kindness term ϕ  measures how kind an action of a player j≠ i is perceived by player i. It 
is the product of the outcome term ∆
8  (the expected difference between two players’ 
payoffs) and the intention factor ϑ (ranging 0 to 1, where 0 means that the action is 
unintentional and 1 that the action is completely intentional).  The  reciprocation term 
measures how much player j’s payoff is altered by player i with her move at node n.
9 The 
advantage of this model is that it captures different motivations that play simultaneously a 
role in the decisional process. Again, the disadvantage is that this model is too complex.  
                                                 
8  () ( ) ( )
' " ' " , , , , i i j i i i s s n s s n n π π − = ∆ , where 
'
i s  is the first order belief (i's belief about j’s behavior) and 
"
i s is the 
second order belief (i's belief about j’s belief about i's behavior). When  j i π π > ,  j  is kind. Otherwise she is 
considered unkind.   
9  () f n, σ =  () ( ) ( )
' " ' " , , , , , i i j i i j s s n s s f n v π π − . When this term is greater than 0, player i is rewarding player j. 
Otherwise, she is punishing player j.    8
 
Charness and Rabin (2002) provide a model of social preferences where they mix social 
welfare concern with reciprocity.
10  
 
In the function: 
 
Vi(π1,π2,…,πN)= ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )( ) [ ] N N i Min π π π δ π π π δ λ π λ + + + − + + − ... * 1 ,..., , * * * 1 2 1 2 1  
 
where: 
λ ∈[0,1]  is a measure of interest in social welfare 
δ ∈(0,1) is a measure of maximin preferences 
πi  is the payoff of player i  
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b, k and f are non-negative parameters of the model; 
dm ∈[0,1] represents how much player m deserves according to player i (the higher dm the 
less player i thinks player m deserves); 
f indicates how much player i wishes to hurt player m when player m is undeserving. 
                                                 
10 Charness and Rabin start by considering three different distributional models (competitive, difference-averse, social 
welfare), but they eventually isolate social welfare concern as the best predictor of people’s behavior. First of all, they 
present a general model of social preferences in two-person games. Player B’s utility function is: 
 
UB (xA, xB) = xB + (ρr + σs + θq) (xA - xB) 
 
Where:  
r = 1 if xA < xB, r = 0 otherwise; 
s = 1 if xA > xB, r = 0 otherwise; 
q = -1 if A has misbehaved, q = 0 otherwise; 
θ is a parameter of reciprocity 
ρ and σ are parameters used to model distributional preferences: 
σ <  ρ < 0 : competitive preferences 
σ < 0 < ρ < 1 : difference-averse preferences 
0 < σ < ρ < 1 : social-welfare preferences 
Charness and Rabin test experimentally all the distributional theories summarized in their first model and they argue 
that subjects are motivated mostly by reciprocity and by the desire of increasing social welfare.   9
 
 
The last step aims to endogenize the demerit profile. This means that the value of dm 
associated to player m by player i depends on how much player i thinks that player m is 
hurting others (and this is true for all the players, player i included). If we consider gi as the 
weight player i is thought to put on social welfare and λ* as the weight he should put, player i 
generates a level of animosity ri in other players that correspond to Min[gi - λ*, 0].
11 In 
equilibrium, di = Max[λ*- gi, 0]. 
The disadvantages of this models are mainly two: heterogeneous social preferences and 
positive reciprocity are excluded. 
Kohler (2003) affirms that, in subjects’ decisional process, social welfare concern plays a 
relevant role when combined with difference aversion (DASM model). According to Kohler, 
the utility function
12 of player i is:  
 
Ui(x) = (1 –γi) xi +  γi ∑
j
j x–   [αi/(N – 1)]max { } 0 , i
i j
j x x − ∑
≠
   
- [βi/(N – 1)]max { } 0 , j
i j
i x x − ∑
≠
   
 
Where: 
αi and βi are (as in Fehr and Schmidt) parameters of envy and of altruism respectively 
0 < βi<1 and αi  > βi 
γi  is a parameter of surplus concern 
0 < γi < 1 
 
Another interpretation of this model is that player i is, at the same time, difference-averse 
and altruist. This is clear if we rewrite her utility function as follows: 
 
 Ui(x) = xi +  γi ∑
≠i j
j x–   [αi/(N – 1)]max { } 0 , i
i j
j x x − ∑
≠
   
- [βi/(N – 1)]max { } 0 , j
i j
i x x − ∑
≠
   
 
                                                 
11 Positive reciprocity is excluded. 
12 Kohler does not consider the egalitarian motivation min { } n x x ,....., 1 , since it is included in difference aversion. This 
is why in his model he talks about a merge of surplus concern and difference aversion rather than a more generic 
interaction between social welfare concern and difference aversion.    10
 
The subject depicted in this model (whatever the interpretation) faces in every scenario a 
trade-off between difference aversion and surplus concern (or altruism). 
   11
 
2. Contributions from other disciplines (sociology, biology, psychology) 
An interdisciplinary approach too tries to solve the ‘puzzle of prosociality’ (Gintis, 2003) 
and to find out why people react to unfairness.  The peculiarity of this approach is that the 
whole process through which people react to unfairness is presented. This means that the 
explanation of the origin of this behavior is provided, as well as its evolutionary 
consequences. 
The first input is given by Gintis (2000), who tries to explain people’s resistance to 
unfairness by introducing the notion of strong reciprocity.
13 According to Gintis, ‘a strong 
reciprocator is predisposed to cooperate with others and punish non-cooperators, even when 
this behavior cannot be justified in terms of self-interest, extended kinship or reciprocal 
altruism’.
14 More generally, a strong reciprocator is a subject who is willing to sacrifice 
resources to punish unfair behavior or the violation of a norm, even when this does not 
provide any current or future material reward (Fehr, Fischbacher, Gächter, 2002). In order to 
understand why the strong-reciprocity phenomenon exists, an interdisciplinary analysis (as 
suggested by Gintis, 2003, 2004) should be done. In particular, it should be relevant to 
combine some important elements coming from sociology (internalisation of norms), biology 
(evolutionary models of cultural transmission implying vertical transmission, oblique 
transmission and horizontal transmission) and psychology (people’s predisposition to 
internalize norms and relevance of the role played by emotions in the decisional process).  
The process who leads to strong reciprocity behavior is the following. Society can 
determine people’s behavior through moral principles or social conventions (Rushton, 1982). 
Their creation is aimed to improve the quality of life in society. They create expectations and 
play a relevant role in the determination of order and stability within the society. As human 
beings are genetically predisposed to internalize norms, they enter the cultural inheritance 
that each new individual in the society has to learn in order to get on with the other members. 
This cultural inheritance influences people’s behavior as well as the genetic inheritance 
(Smith J.M., 1982). 
                                                 
13 The relevance of the role played by strong reciprocity in the evolutionary process of a society is explained by Gintis 
(2000) and Boyd et al. (2003). They affirm that kin selection (Hamilton, 1964), reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) and 
indirect reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998) cannot explain the presence of strong reciprocators, while between-
group selection favours strong reciprocity. In particular, Gintis shows that strong reciprocity is a relevant factor that 
makes it possible for human groups to survive when facing extinction treats, such as war, pestilence, famine or 
environmental catastrophes. Boyd et al. (2003) underline the importance of  the presence of altruistic punishers (strong 
reciprocators who punish defectors, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain) to sustain 
cooperation even in large groups. 
14 Gintis , 2003, p.169   12
 
There are two important processes to ‘learn’ culture: imitation and internalisation
15 
(Rushton, 1982). When subjects follow culture principles through imitation, social norms are 
external. People act pro-socially not because they understand the real meaning of their 
actions, but either because of social rewards and punishments effect
16 or simply because it is 
easy and profitable to imitate a shared action. On the other hand, when subjects internalize 
social norms, they act following a sort of social conscience: they have the duty to give 
something back to the society (Freeman, 1997). ‘[…] each individual acquire[s] an entire 
behavioral model about how to deal with specific types of situations’.
17 To sum up, to 
internalize means to ‘promote some norms from means  to  goals’.
18 There are different 
channels to transmit norms: vertical transmission (from parents to children), oblique 
transmission (through socialization institutions) and horizontal transmission (from peer 
interactions). During the process of internalisation also the emotional sphere is involved. 
Emotions induce individuals to obey social norms. When people internalize culture, they feel 
morally obliged to follow social norms, and if they violate them they will suffer from an 
interior self-punishment (Masclet et al., 2003). Moreover, they experience negative emotions 
(desire of revenge, desire of fighting against injustice, anger) when someone deviates 
(Bosman and van Winden, 1999; Abbink, Sadrieh and Zamir, 2002; Decker, Stieheler and 
Strobel, 2003; Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2000).
19 These negative emotions caused by the 
violation of  a social norm are the strongest source of strong negative reciprocity, as well as 
the positive emotions due to subjects’ cooperation or, generally, kind behavior enhance 
strong positive reciprocity reactions.
20  
An interesting result has been obtained by Brosnan and de Waal (2003) with monkeys. 
They discover that the sense of justice is widespread also among them. This could be the 
proof that the desire of fairness and the reaction to unfair situations is not a cultural fact but a 
                                                 
15 This theory has been appreciated by some important scholars that have developed interesting economics theory about 
cooperation and punishment activities introducing social norms, metanorms (Axelrod,  1986) and conventions (Sugden, 
1986). In particular, it is relevant to say that Axelrod has provided the first evidence that metanorms and internalization 
of norms are mechanisms that successfully implement  cooperation.  
 
16Sacco and Zamagni (1994) call this phenomenon ‘enlightened opportunism’. 
17 Henrich et al., 2001, p.9.  
18 Gintis, 2004, p.60 
19 Masclet et al. (2003) talk about the ‘internal peer pressure, called guilt, and [the] external peer pressure called shame’ 
(p.378).   
20 Neuroscientific research shows that emotions play an important role in the determination of decisions (Damasio, 
1994; Picard, 1997). Bosman and van Winden (1999) give a good description of how and when emotions emerge, 
which are their consequences and how it is possible to measure their intensity. Other empirical works have shown that 
people behave fairly because of the sense of happiness that they feel when they act kindly and pro-socially (Rilling et 
al., 2002). This means that subjects are genetically and psychologically inclined to act under the influence of emotions. 
Moreover, it has been shown that, even if emotions are typically of short duration, their effect on decision making is 
robust and persistent over time (Bosman, Sonnemans and Zeelenberg, 2001) and not of short duration as suggested by 
Hirshleifer (1987) and Bosman and van Winden (1999).   13
 
genetical one. However, not enough evidence about that exists and, at the moment, this 
approach is not relevant from the economic point of view.  
Recent studies in neuroeconomics (Rilling et al. 2002; Camerer et al., 2004) are devoted 
to the relation between people’s reactions and specific cerebral activities. According to this 
approach, people with a stronger activation of the insula (the region of the brain that detects 
negative emotions like pain and disgust) and of the dorsal striatum (the part of the brain 
where an emotional reward emerges as the result of a goal-directed action) are more likely to 
react to unfairness.
21 However, this approach is still in its infancy.   
 
 
                                                 
21 The work of de Quervain et al. (2004) is based on the hypothesis that the possibility of punishing unfair behaviors 
activates reward-related neural circuits. In their experiment the authors obtain two important results. The first is that 
people have a sort of taste for punishing the violation of social norms since this leads to a feeling of satisfaction. The 
second is that, as affirmed by Rabin, intentions matter.   14
 
3. The experimental evidence 
As it is suggested by Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Fehr (2001), in real world situations 
fairness matters. It is a relevant factor not only within the family and with friends, but also in 
public policy issues and in the enforcement of informal agreements and incomplete contracts 
(for a more complete list of examples, see Fehr, 2001).  
However, since in real world scenarios it is difficult (if not impossible) to isolate fairness-
driven behavior from strategic actions, a lot of experimental works are devoted to the study 
of fairness. Experimental economics can provide a large number of laboratory experiments 
where it is shown that fair-minded people exist and where the different expressions of 
fairness previously mentioned are tested.  
 
One of the most used games to detect subjects’ fair behavior is the Ultimatum Game. It is 
a sort of take-it-or-leave-it bargaining. There are two players: the Proposer (Player A) who 
decides how to allocate a sum of money, and the Receiver (Player B) who can either accept 
or refuse the sum offered by the Proposer. If the Receiver accepts, the payoff of each player 
will be assigned according to the partition decided by the Proposer. If the Receiver refuses, 
both players will receive nothing. The refusal can be seen as a sort of costly punishment that 
the Receiver applies to the unfair Proposer. 
 
Figure 2. 
The Ultimatum game 
                                
                                       Proposer 
 
 
                       




                  S-R                          0 
                      R                             0 
 
 
Refuses Accepts   




S = sum to be allocated 
R = sum that A transfers to B 
 
The theoretical prediction in one-shot games and finitely repeated games (by backward 
induction), with rational and self-interested subjects, is that the Proposer will offer a very 
small quantity of money ε, while the Receiver will accept since ε is greater than 0.
22 
However, a large number of experimental results shows that also in one-shot games the 
Receiver often refuses unfair offers. Typically, a sum of less than 20% of the total is rejected 
with probability 0.4 to 0.6 and this probability decreases as the size of the offer increases (i.e. 
Güth et al., 1982; Roth, 1995, Camerer and Thaler, 1995).  
Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) compare the importance of inequity aversion and 
reciprocity in the decisional process by using different mini Ultimatum Games.
23 They find 
out that both inequity aversion and reciprocity matter and they suggest that mixed models 
(like the model by Falk and Fischbacher) are probably more suitable to explain subjects’ 
behavior. 
Abbink, Sadrieh and Zamir (2004) analyse the propensity to reject unfair offers in mini 
Ultimatum Games to compare inequity-aversion motivations and emotional factors. They 
find that inequity aversion matters, while they find no support for the hypothesis that the 
rejections are motivated by emotions. 
 
In the Public Good Game (a very good, albeit not recent, survey is by Ledyard, 1995) n 
people are endowed with a sum of money and they have to decide whether to contribute to 
the provision of a public good. The typical monetary payoff of each player is: 

















                                                 
22 The situation is a bit different in infinitely repeated games, where the Receiver is more likely to refuse small 
quantities of money in order to punish the unfair Proposer and to implement a more generous offer. 
23 That is, the Proposer is not allowed to choose any distribution of the given sum between herself and the Receiver, but 
she faces only two possible allocations. In some treatments, the Proposer has to choose between a fair and an unfair 





α < 1 
 
αn > 1 
 
and: 
Si = the endowment of player i 







= the revenue due to the investment of all the players in the provision of the public 
good 
 
This means that the return of one euro in the public good is less than one. Moreover, the 
typical features of public goods (non-rivalness in consumption and non-excludability from 
consumption) make it possible for people to free ride. That is, someone may find it profitable 
to take all the benefits from those goods without paying for them. On the other hand, it turns 
out from the structure of the game that high contributions from everyone would make every 
player better off. In order to enhance the contribution to the public good, the possibility to 
punish free-riders in a second stage of the game can be added. However, punishment 
activities have a cost for those who decide to sanction non-cooperative subjects. This is why 
the theoretical prediction in one-shot games and finitely repeated games, with rational and 
self-interested subjects, is that nobody will spend to punish free-riders (second order 
dilemma) and each player will contribute nothing to the provision of the public good.
24  
Fehr and Gächter (2000) report that, when punishment is possible, it is a credible threat. 
In their experiment, roughly 80% cooperates fully and higher punishments are the reaction to 
lower contribution levels.  
The Public Good Game is used in another study by Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2005) to 
show that ‘within the class of fairness theories, those that are based on the notion of 
retaliation
25 are the most promising’.
26 
Carpenter and Matthews (2005) use two variants of the Public Good Game: the Mutual 
Monitoring Game and the Social Reciprocity Game. In the former, they look for the presence 
                                                 
24 The situation is a bit different in infinitely repeated games, where punishment is a sort of investment to enhance 
cooperation in the long run. 
25 That is, reciprocity.  
26 Falk, Fehr and Fishbacher (2005), p.31.   17
 
of strong reciprocators as people who sacrifice their material interest to react against subjects 
who free-ride within their group, while in the latter, they search for social reciprocators as 
individuals who sacrifice their pecuniary well-being to sanction also people who free-ride in 
another group. In other words, social reciprocity is a generalised notion of strong reciprocity, 
effective not only in a contest of membership but also in different groups of people (for 
example, groups of neighbours). Their results report that both kinds of reciprocity exist and 
that, under some circumstances where the population is balanced
27, they survive selection. 
On the other hand, where the population is unbalanced and the number of free-riders is too 
high, they decline and eventually die. 
 
 A game that is very similar to the Public Good Game is the Prisoner’s Dilemma. It is 
well known that the only Nash equilibrium is mutual defection, while mutual cooperation 
would make players better-off. To avoid defection, the possibility to punish non-cooperative 
players can be added in a second stage of the game. However, as in the previous game, 
punishment activities have a cost and also in this case we face a second order dilemma. 
Therefore, the theoretical prediction in one-shot games and finitely repeated games, with 
rational and self-interested subjects, is that nobody punishes and mutual defection is 
established. Once again the empirical evidence does not confirm the theoretical results: on 
average, 60-70% of cooperators punish defectors (Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005). Fehr 
and Fischbacher (2004a) obtain a similar result. 
 
The Third Party Punishment Game is a two-stage game that involves three players: the 
Dictator (player A), the Recipient (player B) and an Observer (player C).  
In the first stage, a Dictator game between A and B is played. This means that player A is 
endowed with a sum and he can transfer part of it to player B, while player B cannot react to 
any decision of A.  
In the second stage player C observes the division of the sum between the two players 
and decides whether to punish A if the partition is too unfair. Punishment
28 is costly for 
player C and consists of a reduction of the payoff of player A. Figure 3 describes the 
situation. 
                                                 
27  In a balanced population there is the same initial fraction of people belonging to the different groups. In the example 
presented by Carpenter and Matthews the five considered groups are: Strong Reciprocators, Social Reciprocators, Pure 
Social Reciprocators (they react only against outgroup free riders), Second order Free Riders (they do not free ride but 
never react to others’ free riding) and Free Riders.   
28 This is what is called ‘altruistic punishment’ since this activity implies only a cost for the Observer and no gain  
(Fehr and Gächter , 2002).   18
 
   19
 
Figure 3. 
The Third Party Punishment Game 
 














S = sum to be allocated 
R = sum that A transfers to B 
J = C’s initial endowment 
p = sanction decided by C 
a = cost of each single unit of punishment 
 
The economic theoretical prediction is that, in a situation with rational and self-interested 
subjects, since the punishment is costly and player C is not supposed to gain material benefits 
from this activity, he will never punish player A. Consequently, player A will give no money 
to player B.  
However, also in this case, the empirical evidence is not in line with the previous 
theoretical prediction: at any level of the Dictator’s transfer below half of her endowment, 
roughly 60% of the Observer punish the unfair Dictator (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004).    
 
The Power to Take Game is a two-stage game played by two participants: the Take 
Authority (player A) and the Responder (player B). Before the beginning of the first stage, 
each player has to do a real effort task to earn the initial endowment. 
R
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    R                                                R 
 
J-ap                                                 J 
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In the first stage, player A decides which percentage of B’s income (a sort of tax rate) is 
to be transferred to the Take Authority after stage two. In the second stage the Responder can 
either keep her income untouched and transfer to the Take Authority the stated percentage, or 
destroy any part of her own income in order to transfer to the Take Authority a lower amount 
of money. Then, income destruction can be considered as a punishment for player A. Also in 
this game, punishment is costly for player B. 
 
Figure 4. 
The Power to Take Game 
                                        Take Authority 
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π = tax rate 
S = initial endowment of the Responder 
K = initial endowment of the Take Authority 
α  = percentage of income destroyed by the Responder 
 
The economics theory for one-shot and finitely repeated games predicts that, since the 
punishment is costly and player B is not supposed to gain material benefits from this activity, 
she will never punish player A. Consequently, player A will ask a very high tax rate (even 
99%) to player B.  
However, also in this case, the empirical evidence is not in line with the previous 
theoretical prediction: in the experiment by Bosman and van Winden (1999), when the tax 
destroys S   does not 
 destroy S 
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rate is equal to or higher than 70%, 42% of the responders destroyed their income in a one-




The Trust Game is a bilateral game where an Investor and a Trustee receive the same 
endowment S from the experimenter. In the first stage the Investor can invest the whole sum 
S or a part of it by sending any amount y (between 0 and S) to the Trustee. The experimenter 
triples the amount sent to the Trustee such that she receives 3y. In the second stage the 
Trustee can send part of the investment (any amount between 0 and 3y) back to the Investor.  
 
Figure 5. 
The Trust Game 
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29 Bosman and van Winden find out that there is a correlation between the Responder’s negative emotions due to the 
Authority’s unfairness and the probability to destroy  her income. Moreover, they confirm Rabin’s idea that the 
intentions matter: intentional hurting raises the intensity of the consequent negative emotions.  
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Where: 
y = sum sent to the Trustee by the Investor 
z = sum sent back to the Investor by the Trustee 
S = each player’s initial endowment  
 
The theoretical prediction in one-shot games and finitely repeated games (by backward 
induction), with rational and self-interested subjects, is that the Trustee will send back to the 
Investor 0, and, consequently, the Investor will send 0 to the Trustee. In the experiments the 
Investor invests more than 0 and the Trustee gives back to the Investor more than 0 (Berg et 
al., 1995). Camerer and Fehr (2003) say that on average y is equal to 0.5S and z is a bit less 
than y. Moreover, it seams that z increases as y increases, as a sort of positive reciprocity 
between the Investor and the Trustee.   
 
The Gift Exchange Game is a variant of the previous game that describes the principal-
agent relation in an incomplete contracts contest. In the first stage, the Employer (the 
principal) offers a wage w ∈ [w,  w] (where w > 0) to the Worker (the agent). The Worker 
decides whether to accept or not. If she rejects, both players receive nothing. In the second 
stage, the Worker decides her effort e ∈ [e, e] (where e > 0).  
 
Figure 6. 
The Gift Exchange Game 
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w = wage proposed by the Employer 
v = marginal value of effort for the Employer 
e = effort chosen by the Worker 
c(e) = effort cost for the Worker 
 
The theoretical prediction in one-shot games and finitely repeated games (by backward 
induction), with rational and self-interested subjects, is that the Employer offers the 
minimum wage w and that the Worker never rejects and chooses the lowest level of effort e. 
The experimental evidence (Fehr et al., 1993) reports that the effort level increases as w 
increases. This means that the Worker rewards with a high level of effort a generous wage 
(40% to 50% of the cases).  
 
The  Moonlight Game (Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2000) is a two-player sequential 
game. In the first stage both players are given an endowment (EA and EB respectively). Player 
A has to choose an action. She can give money (T) to B, take away money (W) from B or do 
nothing. If she decides to give money to B, the experimenter will multiply A’s transfer by a 
parameter α (the real transfer that is received by B is αT). In the second stage player B can 
spend resources either to punish (P) or to reward (R) A, or she can decide to do nothing. If 
she decides to punish, A’s income will be reduced of  βP. 
 
The game is depicted in Figure 7 where: 
EA = initial endowment of player A 
EB = initial endowment of player B 
T  = transfer from A to B 
W = A’s withdraw of money from B’s endowment  
R  = reward 
P  = punishment  
α  = reward coefficient 
β  = punishment coefficient Figure 7. 
The Moonlight Game 
 














By backward induction, player B will neither punish nor reward and player A will always 
take away from B the maximum amount of money. Actually, the more A takes away from B, 
the more B is willing to sanction (Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2000). 
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4. Not only fairness 
The fact that fair-minded subjects exist does not mean that fairness is the unique factor 
that influences people’s actions. Even fair-minded people react to economic incentives and it 
is possible that a subject who behaves fairly in a particular scenario does not in a different 
situation (Bosman and van Winden, 1999). 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Fischbacher, Fong and Fehr (2003), show that competition 
may override fairness effects if there is no possibility for a single player to enforce an 
equitable outcome. A typical example is the Ultimatum Game with Responder competition. 
Consider the case where one Proposer offers a sum (s) to several Responders. If all the 
Responders reject her offer, all the players receive nothing. If one Responder accepts the 
Proposer’s offer, the Proposer and the accepting Responder receive (1-s) and (s) respectively. 
If more than one Responder accepts, the Proposer receives (1-s) and a randomly chosen 
Receiver receives (s).  
When more than one Responder interacts with the Proposer, it is probable that at least 
one of the Responders is self-interested. This implies that at least one of the Responders 
accepts the Proposer’s offer and that the rejection of a fair-minded Responder either to 
punish the unfair Proposer or to ensure a more equitable outcome is useless (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999). The result is that even fair-minded people act as self-interested individuals. 
Moreover, the stronger the competition, the stronger the result (Fischbacher, Fong and Fehr, 
2003). 
The ‘cost’ of fairness seems to be relevant too. An example is provided by some pilots I 
run in ALEX by implementing the Solomon’s Game (Ottone, 2005). In the first stage two 
subjects play a Dictator Game. In the second stage a third player enters the game and decides 
whether to punish the Dictator and/or to transfer money  to the Receiver. It turns out that 
people intervene more (by punishing and/or transferring) when the cost of intervention is 
lower. 
It is also possible that more that one motivation (including fairness) may explain 
subjects’ not self-interested behavior. Engelmann and Strobel (2000, 2004) show that in 
distribution experiments it is not always possible to establish without any doubt why people 
act. It may be the case that they want ‘to redistribute money from the rich to the poor because 
[they] dislike inequality, because they care for efficiency, or because they care particularly 
for the poorest’.
30  They provide an experimental setting that allows to better identify 
                                                 
30 Engelmann and Strobel, 2004, p.3.  
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5. Summary and conclusions 
In this paper I surveyed the most important theoretical and experimental studies dealing 
with fairness. Several results that are useful for our theme emerge. 
First of all, the experimental evidence suggests that fair-minded people exist. 
Secondly, the contribution given by experimental economics to the theory of fairness is 
crucial both for the provision of a controlled setting (where fairness-driven actions can be 
studied since strategic elements are removed) and for the feed-back of experimental results 
on theoretical models of social preferences. In what regards the models of social preferences, 
hybrid models may provide a better description of human behavior, but they are too complex. 
Every choice between pure models and hybrid models implies a trade-off between likeliness 
and simplicity. 







  Abbink K., Sadrieh A., Zamir S., 2004, ‘Fairness, Public Good, and Emotional 
Aspects of Punishment Behavior’, Theory and Decision, 57(1), 25-57. 
  Axelrod R., 1986, ‘An Evolutionary Approach to Norms’,   American Political 
Science Review, 80(4), 1095-111.  
  Berg J., Dickhaut J., and McCabe K., 1995, ‘Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History’, 
Games and Economic Behavior, 122-142. 
  Bolton G.E., Ockenfels A., 2000, ‘A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and 
Competition’, American Economic Review, 90(1), 166-93. 
  Bosman R., Sonnemans J., Zeelenberg M., 2001, ‘Emotions, Rejections, and Cooling 
off in the Ultimatum Game’, CREED Department of Economics University of Amsterdam, working 
paper.  
  Bosman R., van Winden F., 1999, ‘The Behavioral Impact of Emotions in a Power to 
Take Game: An Experimental Study’, Tinbergen Institute, Discussion Paper 39. 
  Boyd R., Gintis H., Bowles S., Richerson P.J., 2003, ‘The evolution of altruistic 
punishment’, Proceeding of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
100(6), 3531-5. 
  Brosnan S.F., de Waal F.B.M., 2003, ‘Monkeys reject unequal pay’, Nature, 425, 
297-9. 
  Camerer C., Loewenstein G., Prelec D., ‘Neuroeconomics: How neuroscience can 
inform economics’, 2004, Journal of Economic Literature (forthcoming). 
  Camerer C., Thaler R.H., 1995, ‘Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners’, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(2), 109-220. 
  Camerer C.F., Fehr E., 2003, ‘Measuring social norms and preferences using 
experimental games: A guide for social scientists’, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, 
University of Zürich, Working Paper 97. 
  Carpenter J.P., Matthews P.H., 2005. ‘Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or 
Reciprocity?,’ IZA Discussion Papers 1583. 
  Charness G., Rabin M., 2002, ‘Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New 
Model’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3), 817-69 . 




  De Quervain D.J.F., Fischbacher U., Treyer V., Schellhammer M., Schnyder U., 
Buck A., Fehr E., 2004, ‘The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment’, Science, 305, 1254-8.  
  Decker T., Stiehler A., Stroebel M., 2003, ‘A Comparison of Punishment Rules in 
Repeated Public Good Games – An Experimental Study’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 47, 751-
72. 
   Dufwenberg M., Kirchsteiger G, 2004, A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity’, Games 
and Economic Behavior, 47, 268-98.  
  Engelmann D., Strobel M., 2000, ‘An Experimental Comparison of the Fairness Models 
by Bolton and Ockenfels and by Fehr and Schmidt’,  Econometric Society World Congress 2000 
Contributed Papers 1229, Econometric Society. 
  Engelmann D., Strobel M., 2004, ‘Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin 
Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments’, American Economic Review, 94(4),  857-869. 
  Falk A., Fehr E., Fischbacher U., 2000, ‘Testing Theories of Fairness – Intentions 
Matter’, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zürich, Working Paper 63. 
  Falk A., Fehr E., Fischbacher U., 2003, ‘On the Nature of Fair Behavior’, Economic 
Inquiry, 41(1), 20-26. 
  Falk A., Fehr E., Fischbacher U., 2005, ‘Driving Forces behind Informal Sanctions’, 
IZA, Discussion Paper 1635. 
  Falk A., Fischbacher U., 2000, ‘A Theory of Reciprocity’, Institute for Empirical 
Research in Economics, University of Zürich, Working Paper 6 (forthcoming on Games and 
Economic Behavior). 
  Fehr E., 2001, ‘Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity: Evidence and Economic 
Applications’, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zürich, Working Paper 
75. 
  Fehr E., Fischbacher U., 2004, ‘Third Party Punishment and Social Norms’, 
Evolution and Human Behavior, 25, 63-87.  
  Fehr E., Fischbacher U., Gächter S., 2002, ‘Strong Reciprocity, human cooperation 
and the enforcement of social norms’, Human Nature, 13, 1-25. 
    Fehr E., Gächter S., 2000, ‘Cooperation and Punishment in Public Good 
Experiments’, American Economic Review, 90(4), 980-994. 
  Fehr E., Gächter S., 2002, ‘Altruistic punishment in humans’, Nature, 415, 137-140. 
  Fehr E., Schmidt K., 1999, ‘A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXIV, 817-51. 
  Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., Riedl A., 1993, ‘Does fairness prevent market clearing? An 
experimental investigation’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 437-59.  
 
30
  Fischbacher U., Fong C., Fehr E., 2003, ‘Fairness, Errors and the Power of 
Competition’, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zürich, Working Paper 
133. 
  Freeman R.B., 1997, ‘Working for Nothing: the Supply of Volunteer Labor’, Journal 
of Labor Economics, 15(1), 140-66. 
  Geanakoplos J.D, Pearce D., Stachetti E., 1989, ‘Psychological Games and 
Sequential Rationality’, Games and Economic Behavior 1, 60-79. 
  Gintis H., 2000, ‘Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality’, Journal of Theoretical 
Biology, 206, 169-79. 
  Gintis H., 2003, ‘Solving the Puzzle of Prosociality’, Rationality and Society, 15(2), 
155-87. 
  Gintis H., 2004, ‘The genetic side of gene-culture coevolution: internalisation of 
norms and prosocial emotions’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 53, 57-67. 
  Glaeser, E. L. and Sacerdote, B., 2000, "The Determinants of Punishment: 
Deterrence, Incapacitation and Vengeance", NBER Working Paper No. W7676. 
  Guth, W., R. Schmittberger, and B. Schwarze, 1982: ‘An experimental analysis of 
ultimatum bargaining’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3(3), 367-88. 
  Hamilton W.D., 1964, ‘The genetical theory of social behavior’, Journal of 
Theoretical Biology, 7, 1-52. 
  Heinrich J., Boyd R., Bowels S., Camerer C., Fehr E., Gintis H., McElreath R., 2001, 
‘Cooperation, Reciprocity and Punishment in Fifteen Small-scale Societies’, mimeo. 
  Hirschleifer J., 1987, ‘On Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and Promises’, in 
Dupré J. (ed), 1987, Latest on the Best: Essays on Evolution and Optimality, MIT Press, 
Cambridge. 
  Kohler S., 2003, ‘Difference Aversion and Surplus Concern – An Integrated Approach’, 
mimeo.  
  Ledyard J., 1995, ‘Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research’, Ch. 2 in: 
Roth A., Kagel J., Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press. 
  Masclet D., Noussair C., Tucker S., Villeval M., 2003, ‘Monetary and Nonmonetary 
Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism’, American Economic Review, 93(1), 366-
80. 
  Nowak M., Sigmud K., 1998, ‘Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring’, 
Nature, 393, 573-7. 
  Ottone S., 2005, ‘Transfers and Altruistic Punishments in Solomon’s Game 
Experiments’, Working Paper 57, ALEX series, POLIS, University of Eastern Piedmont.  
 
31
  Picard R., 1997, Affective Computing, The MIT Press, Cambridge. 
  Rabin M., 1993, ‘Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics’, 
American Economic Review, 83(5), 1281-1302. 
  Rilling J.K., Gutman D.A., Zeh T.R., Pagnoni G., Berns G.S., Kilts C.D., 2002, ‘A 
neural basis for social cooperation’, Neuron, 35. 
  Roth A.E., 1995, ‘Bargaining Experiments’, in Handbook of Experimental 
Economics, Kagel J., Roth A.E., Princeton University Press. 
  Rushton J.P., 1982, ‘Altruism and Society : A Social Learning Perspective’, Ethics, 
92(3), 425-46. 
  Sacco P.L., Zamagni S., 1994, ‘Un approccio dinamico evolutivo all’altrismo’, Rivista 
Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, 4-6, CII:2, 223-62. 
  Smith J.M., 1982, Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cambridge University Press. 
  Sugden R., 1986, The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare, Basil 
Blackwell.   
  Trivers R.L., 1971, ‘The evolution of reciprocal altruism’, Quarterly Review of 








The full text of the working papers is downloadable at http://polis.unipmn.it/ 
 
*Economics Series    **Political Theory Series   




ε  Stefania Ottone: Fairness: a survey 
2006 n.63*  Andrea  Sisto:  Propensity Score matching: un'applicazione per la creazione di un 
database integrato ISTAT-Banca d'Italia 
 
2005 n.62*  P.  Pellegrino:  La politica sanitaria in Italia: dalla riforma legislativa alla 
riforma costituzionale 
 




ε  Guido Ortona, Stefania Ottone and Ferruccio Ponzano: A simulative assessment 
of the Italian electoral system 
 
2005  n.59
ε  Guido Ortona and Francesco Scacciati: Offerta di lavoro in presenza di 
tassazione: l'approccio sperimentale 
 
2005  n.58*  Stefania Ottone and Ferruccio Ponzano, An extension of the model of Inequity 
Aversion by Fehr and Schmidt 
 
2005  n.57
ε  Stefania Ottone, Transfers and altruistic punishment in Solomon's Game 
experiments 
 
2005  n. 56
ε  Carla Marchese and Marcello Montefiori, Mean voting rule and strategical 
behavior: an experiment 
 
2005 n.55**  Francesco  Ingravalle,  La sussidiarietà nei trattati e nelle istituzioni politiche 
dell'UE. 
 
2005  n. 54*  Rosella Levaggi and Marcello Montefiori, It takes three to tango: soft budget 
constraint and cream skimming in the hospital care market 
 
2005 n.53*  Ferruccio  Ponzano,  Competition among different levels of government: the re-
election problem. 
 
2005  n.52*  Andrea Sisto and Roberto Zanola, Rationally addicted to cinema and TV? An 
empirical investigation of Italian consumers 
. 
2005  n.51*  Luigi Bernardi and Angela Fraschini, Tax system and tax reforms in India 
2005 n.50*  Ferruccio  Ponzano,  Optimal provision of public goods under imperfect 
intergovernmental competition.  
 
2005 n.49* F.Amisano A.Cassone, Proprieta’ intellettuale e mercati: il ruolo della tecnologia e 
conseguenze microeconomiche 
 




ε  Guido Ortona, Voting on the Electoral System: an Experiment 
2004  n.46
ε  Stefania Ottone, Transfers and altruistic Punishments in Third Party 
Punishment Game Experiments. 
 
2004 n.45*  Daniele  Bondonio,  Do business incentives increase employment in declining 
areas? Mean impacts versus impacts by degrees of economic distress. 
 
2004 n.44**  Joerg  Luther,  La valorizzazione del Museo provinciale della battaglia di 
Marengo: un parere di diritto pubblico 
 
2004  n.43*  Ferruccio Ponzano, The allocation of the income tax among different levels of 
government: a theoretical solution 
 
2004  n.42*  Albert Breton e Angela Fraschini, Intergovernmental equalization grants: some 
fundamental principles 
 
2004  n.41*  Andrea Sisto, Roberto Zanola, Rational Addiction to Cinema? A Dynamic Panel 
Analisis of European Countries 
 




ε  Marie Edith Bissey, Claudia Canegallo, Guido Ortona and Francesco Scacciati, 
Competition vs. cooperation. An experimental inquiry 
 
2003  n.38
ε  Marie-Edith Bissey, Mauro Carini, Guido Ortona, ALEX3: a simulation program 
to compare electoral systems 
 
2003  n.37*  Cinzia Di Novi, Regolazione dei prezzi o razionamento: l’efficacia dei due 
sistemi di allocazione nella fornitura di risorse scarse a coloro che ne hanno 
maggiore necessita’ 
 
2003  n. 36*  Marilena Localtelli, Roberto Zanola, The Market for Picasso Prints: An Hybrid 
Model Approach 
 
2003  n. 35*  Marcello Montefiori, Hotelling competition on quality in the health care market. 
2003 n.  34*  Michela Gobbi, A Viable Alternative: the Scandinavian Model of  “Social 
Democracy” 
 
2002  n. 33*  Mario Ferrero, Radicalization as a reaction to failure: an economic  model of  
islamic extremism 
  
2002  n. 32
ε  Guido Ortona, Choosing the electoral system – why not simply the best one? 
 
2002  n. 31**  Silvano Belligni, Francesco Ingravalle, Guido Ortona, Pasquale Pasquino,  
Michel Senellart, Trasformazioni della politica. Contributi al seminario di  
Teoria politica 
 
2002 n.  30*  Franco Amisano, La corruzione amministrativa in una burocrazia di tipo 
concorrenziale: modelli di analisi economica. 
 
2002  n. 29*  Marcello Montefiori, Libertà di scelta e contratti prospettici: l’asimmetria 
informativa nel mercato delle cure sanitarie ospedaliere  
 
2002  n. 28*  Daniele Bondonio, Evaluating the Employment Impact of Business Incentive  
Programs in EU Disadvantaged Areas.  A case from Northern Italy 
2002  n. 27**  Corrado Malandrino, Oltre il compromesso del Lussemburgo verso l’Europa  
federale. Walter Hallstein e la crisi della “sedia vuota”(1965-66) 
 
2002  n. 26**  Guido Franzinetti, Le Elezioni Galiziane al Reichsrat di Vienna, 1907-1911 
 
2002  n. 25
ε  Marie-Edith Bissey and Guido Ortona, A simulative frame to study the 
integration of defectors in a cooperative setting 
 
2001  n. 24*  Ferruccio Ponzano, Efficiency wages and endogenous supervision technology 
 
2001  n. 23*  Alberto Cassone and Carla Marchese,  Should the death tax die? And should it 
leave an inheritance? 
 
2001  n. 22*  Carla Marchese  and Fabio Privileggi, Who participates in tax amnesties?   
Self-selection of risk-averse taxpayers 
 
2001 n.  21*  Claudia  Canegallo,  Una valutazione delle carriere dei giovani lavoratori atipici: 
la fedeltà aziendale premia? 
 
2001 n.  20*  Stefania  Ottone,  L'altruismo: atteggiamento irrazionale, strategia vincente o 
amore per il prossimo? 
 
2001 n.  19*  Stefania  Ravazzi,  La lettura contemporanea del cosiddetto dibattito fra Hobbes 
e Hume 
2001  n. 18*  Alberto Cassone e Carla Marchese, Einaudi e i servizi pubblici, ovvero come 
contrastare i monopolisti predoni e la burocrazia corrotta 
2001  n. 17*  Daniele Bondonio, Evaluating Decentralized Policies: How to Compare the 
Performance of Economic Development Programs across Different Regions or 
States. 
 
2000  n. 16*  Guido Ortona, On the Xenophobia of non-discriminated Ethnic Minorities 
 
2000  n. 15*  Marilena Locatelli-Biey and Roberto Zanola, The Market for Sculptures: An  
Adjacent Year Regression Index 
  
2000  n. 14*  Daniele Bondonio, Metodi per la valutazione degli aiuti alle imprse con 
 specifico target territoriale 
 
2000  n. 13*  Roberto Zanola, Public goods versus publicly provided private goods in a 
 two-class economy 
 
2000 n.  12**  Gabriella Silvestrini, Il concetto di «governo della legge» nella tradizione 
repubblicana. 
 
2000 n.  11**  Silvano Belligni, Magistrati e politici nella crisi italiana. Democrazia dei 
guardiani e neopopulismo 
 
2000  n. 10*  Rosella Levaggi and Roberto Zanola, The Flypaper Effect: Evidence from the 
Italian National Health System 
 
1999  n. 9*  Mario Ferrero, A model of the political enterprise 
 
1999 n.  8*  Claudia Canegallo, Funzionamento del mercato del lavoro in presenza di 
informazione asimmetrica 
 
1999 n.  7**  Silvano  Belligni,  Corruzione, malcostume amministrativo e strategie etiche. Il 
ruolo dei codici. 
  
 
1999 n.  6*  Carla Marchese and Fabio Privileggi, Taxpayers Attitudes Towaer Risk and 
Amnesty Partecipation: Economic Analysis and Evidence for the Italian Case. 
 
1999  n. 5*  Luigi Montrucchio and Fabio Privileggi, On Fragility of Bubbles in Equilibrium 
Asset Pricing Models of Lucas-Type 
 
1999  n. 4**  Guido Ortona, A weighted-voting electoral system that performs quite well. 
 
1999  n. 3*  Mario Poma, Benefici economici e ambientali dei diritti di inquinamento: il caso 
della riduzione dell’acido cromico dai reflui industriali. 
 
1999  n. 2*  Guido Ortona, Una politica di emergenza contro la  disoccupazione semplice, 
efficace equasi efficiente. 
 
1998  n. 1*  Fabio Privileggi, Carla Marchese and Alberto Cassone, Risk Attitudes and the 
Shift of Liability from the Principal to the Agent 
 
  
Department of Public Policy and Public Choice “Polis” 
 
The Department develops and encourages  research  in fields such as: 
•  theory of individual and collective choice; 
•  economic approaches to political systems; 
•  theory of public policy; 
•  public policy analysis (with reference to environment, health care, work, family, culture, 
etc.); 
•  experiments in economics and the social sciences; 
•  quantitative methods applied to economics and the social sciences; 
•  game theory; 
•  studies on social attitudes and preferences; 
•  political philosophy and political theory; 
•  history of political thought. 
 
The Department has regular members and off-site collaborators from other private or public 
organizations.  
Instructions to Authors 
 
Please ensure that the final version of your manuscript conforms to the requirements listed below: 
 
 
The manuscript should  be typewritten single-faced and double-spaced with wide margins. 
 
 
Include an abstract of no more than 100 words. 
 
 
Classify your article according to the Journal of Economic Literature classification system. 
 
 
Keep footnotes to a minimum and number them consecutively throughout the manuscript with 
superscript Arabic numerals. Acknowledgements and information on grants received can be given 
in a first footnote (indicated by an asterisk, not included in the consecutive numbering). 
 
 
Ensure that references  to publications appearing in the text are given as follows: 
COASE (1992a; 1992b, ch. 4) has also criticized this bias.... 
and 
“...the market has  an even more shadowy role than the firm” (COASE 1988, 7). 
 
 
List the complete references alphabetically as follows: 
 
Periodicals: 
KLEIN, B. (1980), “Transaction Cost Determinants of ‘Unfair’ Contractual Arrangements,” 
American Economic Review, 70(2), 356-362. 
KLEIN, B., R. G. CRAWFORD and A. A. ALCHIAN (1978), “Vertical Integration, Appropriable 




NELSON, R. R. and S. G. WINTER (1982), An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, 2nd ed., 
Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA. 
 
 
Contributions to collective works: 
STIGLITZ, J. E. (1989), “Imperfect Information in the Product Market,” pp. 769-847, in  R. 
SCHMALENSEE and R. D. WILLIG (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. I, North 




WILLIAMSON, O. E. (1993), “Redistribution and Efficiency: The Remediableness Standard,” 
Working paper, Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California, Berkeley. 